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Abstract:		
Political	trust	has	become	a	central	focus	of	political	analysis	and	public	lament.	
Political	theorists	and	philosophers	typically	think	of	interpersonal	trust	in	politics	
as	a	fragile	but	valuable	resource	for	a	flourishing	or	stable	democratic	polity.	This	
article	examines	what	conception	of	trust	is	needed	in	order	to	play	this	role.	It	
unpicks	two	candidate	answers,	a	moral	and	a	responsiveness	conception,	the	latter	
of	which	has	been	central	to	recent	political	theory	in	this	area.	It	goes	on	to	outline	
a	third,	commitment	conception	and	to	set	out	how	a	focus	on	commitments	and	
their	fulfilment	provides	a	better	account	of	trust	for	political	purposes.	Adopting	
this	conception	discloses	how	trust	relies	on	a	contestable	public	normative	space	
and	has	significant	implications	for	how	we	should	approach	three	cognate	topics,	
namely,	judgments	of	trust,	the	place	of	distrust,	and	the	relationship	of	
interpersonal	to	institutional	trust	and	distrust.	
	
	
	
The	importance,	fragility	and	dangers	of	trust	and	distrust	have	become	increasingly	
central	topics	for	political	analysis	and	normative	reflection,	as	well	as	for	anguished	
political	brooding.	These	themes	dominate	the	extensive	literature	on	how	and	‘why	we	
hate	politics’,	on	the	wide-scale	erosion	of	public	trust	and	confidence	in	government,	
and	on	the	rise	of	anxieties	about	populism	and	its	cultivated	dialectic	of	distrust	(of	
normal	politics,	parliaments,	the	system)	and	trust	(of	the	leader,	the	movement)	(e.g.,	
Hay	2007;	Hetherington	and	Rudolph	2002;	Levi	and	Stoker	2011;	Norris	2011;	Warren	
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and	Gastil	2015).	A	particular	dimension	of	this	is	a	concern	about	the	ethics	and	
integrity	of	politicians	(Allen	and	Birch	2015),	although	the	targets	of	political	trust	and	
distrust	are	widely	dispersed,	to	include	experts	and	professionals,	the	personalized	
leader,	political	parties,	government,	the	political	classes,	officials	and	bureaucrats,	and	
other	citizens.		Politicians	claim	to	seek	to	earn	our	trust,	and	where	this	seems	to	be	at	
risk,	to	deflect	concerns	about	trust	on	to	other	territory:	in	the	aftermath	of	the	
invasion	of	Iraq,	Tony	Blair	insisted	that	divisions	over	this	were	not	‘over	issues	of	
trust	or	integrity	…	the	real	issue	…	is	not	a	matter	not	of	trust	but	of	judgment’	(cited	
Freeden	2013:	192).		
	 What	do	we	mean	by	trust	such	that	it	matters	to	us	in	this	way?	One	answer,	
which	has	been	predominant	in	the	political	theory	literature	on	trust,	is	that	we	trust	
when	we	think	the	interests	of	those	whom	we	trust	are	aligned	in	the	right	way	with	
ours	or	when	we	think	they	are	motivated	to	support	our	interests.	The	absence	of	this	
alignment	in	politics,	or	at	least	our	inability	to	rely	on	it,	poses	the	problem	of	political	
trust.	As	Mark	Warren	puts	it	in	his	influential	analysis,	‘where	there	is	politics	[…]	the	
conditions	of	trust	are	weak:	the	convergence	of	interests	between	truster	and	trusted	
cannot	be	taken	for	granted’	(Warren	1999:	312;	cf.	Warren	2018:	76;	Hardin	2006;	
Norris	2011:	19-20).		I	argue	that	this	approach	falls	short	of	capturing	what	we’re	
interested	in	when	we	think	about	interpersonal	trust	in	politics,	and	that	instead	we	
can	make	better	sense	of	political	trust	by	seeing	it	as	grounded	in	the	attribution	of	
commitments	to	those	whom	we	trust,	together	with	reliance	on	them	to	fulfil	these.	
Understanding	trust	through	this	lens	allows	us	to	see	the	fragility	of	political	trust	in	a	
different	way:	not	primarily	as	the	product	of	epistemic	uncertainty	or	conflict	of	
interests	but	of	the	political	contestability	that	imbricates	the	commitments	that	
underpin	trust.	
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	 I	develop	this	argument	in	four	stages.	The	following	section	clarifies	the	scope	
and	starting	point	for	the	problem	here:	focusing	on	the	kinds	of	value	that	political	
theorists	of	trust	have	attributed	to	interpersonal	trust,	it	asks,	if	interpersonal	trust,	as	
opposed	to	mere	reliance,	has	a	value	in	politics,	what	concept	of	trust	is	in	play?	
Section	2	examines	and	unpicks	two	candidate	answers,	a	moral	conception	of	trust	and	
what	is	called	here	a	responsiveness	conception,	the	latter	of	which	has	been	central	to	
recent	political	theory	in	this	area.	I	argue	that	these	don’t	successfully	draw	the	line	
between	trust	and	reliance	and	between	trust	and	distrust.	In	their	place,	in	section	3,	I	
outline	an	alternative	approach	that	analyses	trust	through	the	notion	of	a	practical	
commitment	,	and	try	to	show	how	a	focus	on	commitments	and	their	fulfilment	
provides	a	better	account	of	trust	for	political	purposes:	if	political	trust	is	to	have	the	
value	ascribed	to	it,	it	needs	to	take	the	form	of	a	commitment	conception.1	For	a	
commitment	account,	to	trust	someone	to	do	something	involves	attributing	a	
commitment	to	her	to	doing	it	and	to	rely	upon	her	to	meet	that	commitment.	Unlike	the	
responsiveness	account,	this	approach	views	my	trusting	as	neutral	about	the	trusted’s	
motivations	toward	me.	This	attribution	rests	not	only	on	explicitly	undertaken	pledges	
but	on	the	basis	of	the	social	and	political	roles	and	identities	of	those	to	whom	
commitments	are	attributed.	Judgments	about	trust	and	trustworthiness	of	politicians	
and	officials	are	not	then	primarily	judgments	about	whether	they	are	motivated	to	
serve	your	or	my	interests	but	about	what	commitments	we	take	them	to	have	and	
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1	From	the	wider	philosophical	literature	on	trust,	this	particularly	draws	elements	
from	Mullin	(2006),	Gilbert	(2006),	and	Hawley	(2014),	in	ways	outlined	below,	
although	Mullin’s	paradigm	case	is	motherhood	and	Hawley’s	focus	is	also	largely	on	
intimate	relationships.		
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whether	or	not	we	think	they	are	being	fulfilled.	This	has	important	repercussions	for	
when	we	think	of	trust	or	distrust	as	a	legitimate	attitude	to	take	in	politics,	that	is,	
when	we	are	entitled	to	trust.	Section	4	develops	the	contrast	between	responsiveness	
and	commitment	views	and	brings	out	how	adoption	of	the	latter	has	significant	
implications	for	how	we	should	approach	three	cognate	topics,	namely,	judgments	of	
trust,	the	place	of	distrust,	and	the	relationship	of	interpersonal	to	institutional	trust	
and	distrust.	Viewing	political	trust	through	the	commitment	lens	doesn’t	only	help	us	
to	understand	the	claim	that	interpersonal	political	trust	has	value.	It	also	makes	sense	
of	the	way	in	which	trust	is	public	and	contestable,	and	so	political.		
	
1.! Valuing	political	trust	
The	focus	of	this	article	is	conceptual,	on	the	question	‘What	is	it	to	trust?’	not	on	
the	institutional	guardrails	to	help	ensure	that	rulers,	politicians	and	officials	are	
constrained	to	be	trustworthy	or	on	how	citizens	can	have	assurances	of	their	
trustworthiness.	Further,	it	is	specifically	on	interpersonal	trust	in	politics,	and	
particularly	citizens’	trust	in	politicians	and	officials.	This	is	distinct,	then,	from	trust	
primarily	directed	at	objects	(such	as	trusting	in	a	reliably	constructed	shelf	to	take	the	
weight	of	a	vase).	It	is	also	distinct	from	trust	in	institutions,	groups	or	procedures	
(trust	in	the	impartiality	of	a	constitutional	court	or	a	central	bank,	for	example)	
(Newton	2007),	testimonial	trust	or	trust	in	expertise	(e.g.,	O’Neill	2007:154-66;	
Festenstein	2009;	Lane	2014;	Moore	2017)	and	from	trust/distrust	in	political	regimes,	
such	as	the	classical	distrust	of	democracies	for	their	passion-driven	inconstancy	
(Schwartzberg	2007).	On	the	face	of	it,	while	these	other	forms	of	trust	are	important,	
interpersonal	trust	matters	in	politics	because	agency	matters,	together	with	associated	
concepts	such	as	responsibility.		
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For	political	theorists	of	trust,	a	central	thread	of	argument	for	the	importance	of	
trust	has	been	that	is	instrumental	for,	or	constitutive	of,	democratically	valuable	goods.	
Political	trust	is	considered	necessary	for	a	functional	democratic	politics	(e.g.,	Dunn	
1988;	Lenard	2012;	Levi	and	Stoker	2000;	O’Neill	2002;	Rothstein	2011:	145-92;	
Warren	2018).	Stable	and	flourishing	democratic	polities	are	characterized	by	trust	
(e.g.,	Walker	2006,	Lenard	2012,	Murphy	2010,	2016)	where	unstable	and	conflict-
ridden	societies	are	marked	by	its	loss.	While	less	powerful	a	bond	than	solidarity	or	
community,	trust	facilitates	commerce,	politics	and	social	life	more	generally:	it	thought	
to	increase	social	harmony,	allow	for	compromise,	promote	order	and	collective	goods	
without	recourse	to	coercion,	and	expand	the	scope	for	individual	and	social	action.	And	
trust	is	a	ubiquitous	and	often	unrecognised	background	condition	of	social	life	–	
without	trust,	we	could	not	get	up	in	the	mornings,	and	everyday	life	is	a	catalogue	of	
successful	exercises	in	trust	(e.g.,	Luhmann	1979;	Hollis	1998;	Sztompka	1999).		
In	one	influential	version	of	this	argument,	articulated	clearly	by	Patti	Tamara	
Lenard,	voluntary	compliance	with	democratically	established	rules	is	instrumental	for	
democratic	efficacy,	and	trust	is	an	important	ingredient	in	securing	widespread	
voluntary	compliance	with	these	rules	(Lenard	2012).	The	idea	is	that	there	are	norms	
compliance	with	which	requires	that	I	trust	that	others	will	generally	comply:	if	no	one	
else	is	recycling	or	respecting	traffic	regulations	then	my	lack	of	trust	in	others’	
compliance	removes	a	reason	I	have	myself	to	comply.	In	order	for	citizens	to	believe	
that	the	electoral	system	is	functional,	and	therefore	to	participate	and	vote,	citizens	
must	trust	that	their	votes	are	properly	counted,	for	example,	and	that	the	losing	party	
will	give	up	power.	Citizens	on	the	losing	side	must	accept	the	legitimacy	of	the	elected	
party:	the	‘trust	that	underpins	the	willingness	to	comply	voluntarily	with	the	
preferences	of	the	electorate	equally	underpins	the	willingness	to	comply	with	the	
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subsequent	decisions	made	by	the	winner’	(Lenard	2012:	43;	cf.	Miller	1995:	97;	
Richardson	2002:	143-61;	Allen	2004:	27-31;	Offe	2001).	In	this	way	political	trust	is	
instrumentally	valuable	for	democratic	rule,	including	being	needed	in	order	to	sustain	
mechanisms	of	democratic	accountability.	First,	for	a	governing	party	to	give	up	power	
when	it	loses	an	election	requires	that	it	trusts	the	opposition	in	various	ways,	including	
to	give	up	power	in	turn	if	they	in	turn	fall.	Political	leaders,	party	members	and	voters	
need	to	be	able	to	trust	one	another	to	behave	in	this	way	for	electoral	processes	to	
flourish	(Lenard	2012:	42-4;	cf.	Offe	2001).	Second,	there	is	the	argument	that	
democratic	politics	requires	trust	that	participants	will	adhere	to	conventions,	norms	
and	unwritten	rules,	and	when	these	are	flouted	or	‘eroded’	this	damages	the	quality	of	
democracy.	So,	for	example,	when	the	United	States	Republican	Senate	blocked	
President	Obama’s	move	to	make	a	final	Supreme	Court	judicial	appointment,	this	
represented	a	betrayal	of	the	kind	of	trust	in	how	power	can	be	used	that	not	only	
hampered	Obama	but	damaged	the	underlying	culture	and	institutions	of	US	democracy	
(e.g.,	Levitsky	and	Ziblatt	2018).	
	 In	addition,	some	theorists	also	suggest	that	there	are	non-instrumental	reasons	
to	value	political	trust.	From	the	non-instrumental	perspective,	trust,	when	reasonable,	
is	an	important	expression	of	respect	and	a	commitment	to	reciprocity	in	political	
relationships	(Mansbridge	1999;	Murphy	2010,	Murphy	2016).	Its	absence	is	damaging	
to	political	relationships	for	non-instrumental	reasons	as	it	forms	a	constitutive	part	of	
those	relationships	of	mutual	respect	that	are	said	to	underpin	liberal	democracy.	In	
trusting	you	I	extend	a	form	of	non-instrumentally	valuable	moral	recognition	to	you,	
constitutive	of	respecting	your	agency.		
Here	I	want	to	assume	that	interpersonal	trust	is	politically	valuable	in	order	to	
explore	what	trust	is,	if	it	is	to	have	this	value.	So	it’s	not	a	part	of	my	purpose	here	to	
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engage	directly	with	sceptical	arguments	about	the	value	of	political	trust	to	the	effect	
that,	even	if	we	need	to	rely	on	one	another	in	politics,	this	can	be	achieved	without	
trust	as	a	significant	ingredient	(e.g.,	Hardin	2002;	Cook,	Levi	and	Hardin	2005;	
Rosanvallon	2008).		However,	it’s	worth	underlining	that	from	the	instrumental	or	non-
instrumental	perspective,	political	trust	need	only	be	viewed	as	conditionally	valuable	
(Murphy	2010).	In	part,	this	is	because	it	isn’t	always	rational	to	trust,	so	there	are	
conditions	tied	to	the	reliability	of	the	trusted:	when	the	governing	party	refuses	to	step	
down	and	implements	martial	law.	Further,	trust	isn’t	necessarily	functionally	valuable	
for	democratic	politics:	groups	with	high	levels	of	internal	trust	can	work	to	erode	
democratically	valuable	goods	and	institutions.	With	these	ideas	in	place,	I	want	to	turn	
now	to	the	concept	that	underlies	these	evaluative	claims.	
	
	
	
2.! Morality	and	responsiveness	
An	adequate	theory	of	political	trust	needs	to	distinguish	trust	from	a	broader	
conception	of	reliance	or	confidence.	Within	the	rich	philosophical	literature	devoted	to	
the	conceptual	analysis	of	trust	(e.g.,	Baier	1986;	Faulkner	and	Simpson	2017;	Hawley	
2014;	Helm	2014;	Holton	1994;	Jones	1996;	McLeod	2015;	O’Neill	2002;	Pettit	1995;	
Simpson	2012,),	trust	normally	is	viewed	as	bounded	by	domain	so	it	has	a	basic	
tripartite	structure,	on	top	of	which	further	elaborations	can	be	made:	A	trusts	B	with	
respect	to	X	(e.g.,	Baier	1986:	236;	Hardin	1993:	505;	Hardin	1999:	26;	Lenard	2012;	
Murphy	2010;	Weinstock	1999:	293).	So	there	is	a	question	of	what	ingredient(s)	need	
to	be	added	to	A’s	reliance	on	B	with	respect	to	X	in	order	to	allow	us	to	think	of	this	
attitude	of	reliance	as	trust.		
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One	way	of	thinking	about	what	is	needed	here	is	that	it	should	allow	us	to	make	
sense	of	the	different	reactive	attitudes	within	which	trust	seems	embedded;	in	
particular,	the	distinction	between	disappointment	at	having	expectations	unmet	and	
betrayal	(e.g.,	Mullin	2005:	316-7;	Gilbert	2006;	Murphy	2010:	76;	Lenard	2012;	
Hawley	2014).2	When	we	trust,	we	aren’t	just	disappointed	or	let	down	in	the	face	of	
non-performance	but	betrayed.	As	Margaret	Gilbert	puts	it,	‘[i]f	I	am	not	in	a	position	to	
trust	you	to	do	something	you	cannot	betray	me	when	you	fail	to	do	it.	You	can	surprise	
me,	disappoint	me,	wound	me,	but	you	cannot	betray	me.	Whatever	lays	me	open	to	
betrayal	legitimates	my	trust’	(Gilbert	2006:	152;	cf.	Murphy	2010:	76fn).	We	rely	on	
others	all	the	time	in	politics,	in	the	sense	of	acting	in	a	way	that	depends	on	their	more	
or	less	predictable	behaviour.	Some	German	conservatives	in	Weimar	made	the	
mistake,	from	their	point	of	view,	of	relying	on	Hitler,	particularly	thinking	that	he	
would	be	manageable	in	power	and	broadly	that	his	rule	would	promote	their	interests.	
However,	we	needn’t	attribute	to	them	misplaced	trust.	The	question,	then,	is	what	
conditions	put	me	in	a	position	to	trust	you,	in	this	sense.	
	 A	tempting	proposal	for	this	additional	ingredient	is	the	expectation	of	
someone’s	acting	in	a	way	that	is	morally	required	or	commendable.	The	betrayal	of	
trust	that	distinguishes	it	from	merely	disappointed	expectations	that	accompany	other	
forms	of	reliance	has	a	moral	character.	So	those	who	feel	that	Blair	betrayed	them	have	
an	expectation	that	he	should	adhere	to	a	moral	norm	of	honesty	that	in	fact	he’s	
flouted:	they	trusted,	they	may	say,	because	they	relied	on	him	to	act	from	this	moral	
norm.	However,	this	seems	unnecessarily	to	moralise	trust,	when	being	trustworthy	
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2	On	the	importance	of	reactive	attitudes	(Strawson	1962)	for	thinking	about	trust,	in	
particular	for	thinking	about	misplaced	trust,	see	Holton	1994.	
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and	trusting	another	needn’t	always	be	morally	good.	Even	if	the	capacities	required	for	
trusting	and	being	trustworthy	may	be	important	for	an	account	of	moral	capacities,	it	
doesn’t	follow	that	someone’s	trustworthiness	is	morally	obligatory	or	commendable:	
you	can	trust	a	contract	killer	you’ve	hired	but	it	doesn’t	follow	that	what	you	trust	her	
to	do	is	morally	admirable.	A	domestic	abuser	may	be	able	to	trust	his	abused	spouse	to	
meet	his	needs	but	her	trustworthiness	is	also	morally	suspect.3	
This	moralised	view	of	trust	also	glosses	over	well-rehearsed	‘realist’	arguments	
about	what	moral	integrity	in	politics	consists	in,	how	it	differs	from	morality	tout	court,	
or	at	least	begs	the	question	as	to	whether	there	are	relevant	differences	(e.g.,	Philp	
2007;	Jay	2010;	Mearsheimer	2011;	Sleat	2018).	As	Peter	Johnson	notes,	there	is	a	
tension	in	demands	put	upon	politicians	(Johnson	1993):	those	who	are	morally	
trustworthy	in	the	private	sense	may	be	politically	ineffective	at	achieving	desirable	
ends.	So	we	are	compelled	to	trust	those	with	dirty	hands,	or	at	least	the	disposition	to	
get	their	hands	dirty.		
There	are,	then,	reasons	to	resist	the	identification	of	trust	and	trustworthiness	
and	moral	integrity.	In	any	case,	the	dominant	proposal	for	the	missing	ingredient	
among	political	theorists	is	what	I	will	call	here	responsiveness:	that	it’s	necessary	for	
my	trusting	you	that	I	think	that	you	are	responsive	to	my	interests,	in	the	right	way.	
You	can	rely	on	a	dependable	bus	driver,	in	other	words,	but	can	trust	your	friend	to	get	
you	to	the	airport	on	time,	since	she	is	motivated	toward	you	in	the	right	way.	For	
example,	trust	is	viewed	by	Karen	Jones	as	an	optimistic	affective	attitude	about	
someone,	to	the	effect	that	her	good	will	and	competence	covers	‘the	domain	of	our	
interaction	with	her,	together	with	the	expectation	that	the	one	trusted	will	be	directly	
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3	On	moral	suspicion	and	trust,	see	Baier	1986:	259-60;	Warren	1999:	328.		
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and	favourably	moved	by	the	thought	that	we	are	counting	on	her’	(Jones	1996:	1;	cf.	
Baier	1986:	259).	For	political	theorists	who	follow	this	line,	such	as	Colleen	Murphy	in	
her	work	on	political	reconciliation	(2010),	what	matters	is	this	affective	orientation	
toward	the	good	will	of	the	trusted	person.	In	Russell	Hardin’s	epistemic	version	of	
responsiveness,	to	‘say	that	I	trust	you	with	respect	to	some	matter	means	that	I	have	
reason	to	expect	you	to	act	in	my	interest	with	respect	to	that	matter	because	you	have	
good	reasons	to	do	so,	reasons	that	are	grounded	in	my	interest’	(1999:	26,	emphasis	in	
original).	For	this	‘encapsulated	interest’	account,	I	trust	when	I	judge	that	I	can	rely	on	
you	because	you	are	motivated	to	look	after	my	interests.	Trust	is	the	judgment	that	
your	interests	encapsulate	mine,	in	the	right	way.	What	Hardin	stresses	is	that	it	is	not	
enough	that	B	furthers	A’s	interests	simply	because	his	own	coincide	with	hers,	for	a	
trust	relationship	to	hold.	In	such	cases,	B	may	be	dependable,	reliable,	predictable,	and	
so	on,	by	A,	but	not	trustworthy.	Rather,	‘I	trust	you	because	I	think	it	is	your	interest	to	
attend	to	my	interests	in	the	relevant	matter.	This	is	not	merely	to	say	that	you	and	I	
have	the	same	interests.	Rather	it	is	to	say	that	you	have	an	interest	in	attending	to	my	
interests,	because,	typically,	you	want	our	relationship	to	continue’	(Hardin	2002:	4).	
Although	this	is	a	responsiveness	conception,	it	is	grounded	in	a	starkly	cognitivist	form	
of	risk	assessment	rather	than	affective	apprehension	of	the	good	will	of	the	other	
(Hardin	1993:	516;	cf.	Hardin	1999:	24).4		
Responsiveness	accounts	are	attractive	since	they	capture	a	vital	source	of	our	
interest	in	understanding	trust	and	assessing	trustworthiness.	For,	the	idea	is,	we	rely	
on	those	we	trust	to	provide	us	with,	or	to	protect	or	foster,	some	good.	And	to	act	on	
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4	Here	he	differs	from	Coleman	(1990:	99),	whose	rational	actor	account	is	framed	as	a	
decision	on	whether	to	place	a	bet.	
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trust	is	to	place	oneself	in	a	relation	of	vulnerability	and	dependence:	if	you	trust	me	to	
take	you	to	the	airport,	you	run	the	risk	that	I	won’t	in	fact	turn	up	and	you’ll	miss	your	
flight:	‘where	one	depends	on	another’s	good	will,	one	is	necessarily	vulnerable	to	the	
limits	of	that	good	will.	One	leaves	others	an	opportunity	to	harm	when	one	trusts	and	
also	shows	one’s	confidence	that	they	will	not	take	it’	(Baier	1986:	235).	Following	this	
analysis,	the	focus	on	vulnerability,	tied	to	the	responsiveness	conception,	has	been	
assumed	or	elaborated	by	a	number	of	social	and	political	theorists	of	trust	(Bernstein	
2011;	Giddens	1990:	34,	Johnson	1993:	18;	Lenard	2012:	18-20;	Mansbridge	1999:	294;	
Pettit	1998:	298).	
As	in	the	moralised	notion	of	trust,	responsiveness	captures	an	important	
dimension	of	what	we’re	interested	in	when	we	invoke	trust	but,	in	general	terms,	there	
are	some	difficulties	with	the	idea	that	responsiveness	offers	a	satisfactory	account	of	
interpersonal	trust.	I	can	trust	(or	distrust)	without	attributing	to	you	a	view	of	how	
you’re	motivated	in	relation	to	my	interests.	For	example,	I	can	trust	a	tennis	opponent	
to	play	by	the	rules	and	norms	of	fair	play	without	thinking	that	she’s	doing	so	out	of	
any	responsiveness	to	my	interests:	while	she	may	be	indifferent	to	them	or	be	
motivated	to	humiliate	me,	I	can	nevertheless	trust	her	to	play	the	game	with	me	in	the	
right	spirit.	In	the	event	that	you	don’t	behave	in	a	trustworthy	fashion,	I	may	feel	
betrayed	but	that	is	still	distinct	from	being	vulnerable	to	you	in	the	sense	of	
experiencing	some	adverse	impact	on	my	interests	that	the	responsiveness	conception	
makes	core	or	of	thinking	that	you	are	not	appropriately	motivated	in	relation	to	my	
interests.	If	I	promise	to	take	your	friend	to	the	airport,	you	may	trust	me	to	do	this,	
believing	in	my	punctuality	and	reliability:	you	have	no	interest	in	her	catching	her	
flight	but	still	may	feel	in	the	appropriate	sense	betrayed	or	let	down	if	I	fecklessly	don’t	
turn	up.		
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Still,	should	we	accept	the	account	of	political	trust	in	responsive	terms,	
embodied	‘by	an	attitude	of	optimism	with	respect	to	the	competence	and	will	of	other	
citizens	and	officials’	(Murphy	2010:	77;	Lenard	2012:	18-19)?	One	important	line	of	
scepticism	about	this	was	developed	by	Hardin,	for	whom	the	specific	barriers	to	
political	trust	are	epistemological	and	motivational.	You	can’t	know	the	motives	of	
politicians	and	officials	so	it	would	not	be	sensible	to	assume	that	these	encapsulate	
your	interests.	The	cognitive	opacity	of	politicians	and	officials	means	that	the	epistemic	
demands	of	trust	are	impossible	to	satisfy	when	it	comes	to	ascertaining	whether	or	not	
to	trust	them.	To	say	I	trust	you	is	to	say	that	I	expect	you	to	act	for	your	reasons	in	a	
way	that	tracks	my	reasons	in	some	matter.	Your	interest	encapsulates	my	interest.	It	is	
not	possible	to	have	cognitive	trust	in	officials	and	citizens	on	the	whole,	because	of	the	
size	and	complexity	of	modern	societies:	we	do	not	have	the	ongoing	cooperative	
relationships	or	thick	personal	knowledge	of	one	another	that	helps	to	overcome,	or	at	
least	address,	the	problems	of	opacity	and	conflict	of	interests	(Hardin	1999:	28).	
Further,	we	can’t	view	government	as	cooperating	with	us,	since	we	are	generally	
subject	to	its	immense	power.	This	means	I	can’t	trust	it	‘because	my	power	dependence	
undermines	any	hope	I	might	have	to	get	you	to	reciprocally	cooperate	with	me’	
(Hardin	2006:	152;	cf.	Farrell	2004).	So	there	is	generally	nothing	we	can	do	to	make	
governmental	agents	entirely	trustworthy.	
From	this	perspective,	since	we	can’t	have	the	kind	of	knowledge	he	thinks	we	
need	in	order	to	judge	that	politicians	and	officials	are	trustworthy,	and	so	can’t	trust	
them,	trust	can’t	be	a	significant	element	in	democratic	politics.	Both	the	instrumental	
and	non-instrumental	arguments	for	the	value	of	political	trust	go	awry,	then,	from	this	
perspective.	Social	cooperation	may	be	instrumentally	important	for	important	social	
goods	but	should	be	understood	without	trust	as	an	ingredient	(Cook,	Hardin	and	Levi	
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2005).	And	if	there	is	a	norm	of	generalized	mutual	respect	or	reciprocity	then	this	too	
should	not	involve	trust	since	we	can’t	have	the	kind	of	knowledge	we	would	need	to	
know	that	everyone	whom	we	should	respect	encapsulates	our	interests	in	the	right	
way.	An	implication	of	this	is	that	much	of	the	concern	about	an	alleged	crisis	of	trust	in	
politics	is	over-blown,	since	trust,	in	the	encapsulated-interest	sense,	can’t	plausibly	
play	much	of	a	role	in	government,	so	can’t	be	a	major	consideration	in	the	working	of	a	
modern	society.	Indeed,	by	tantalizing	us	with	something	that	we	can’t	in	most	
conceivable	circumstances	reasonably	expect	to	have,	this	kind	of	talk	of	a	crisis	in	trust	
plays	a	role	in	generating	the	cynicism	that	it	often	bemoans.	
Even	within	its	own	terms,	Hardin’s	particular	epistemological	focus	squeezes	
out	some	of	the	other	reasons	we	are	interested	in	determining	whether	we	can	or	
should	trust.	We	are	not	only	uncertain	about	whether	an	agent	will	be	motivated	
toward	us	in	a	certain	way.	What	matters	in	trusting	are	also	the	potential	costs	of	A’s	
unreliability,	as	well	as	the	potential	costs	of	foregoing	trust.	While	it	is	indeed	difficult	
to	know	whether	or	not	politicians	and	officials	encapsulate	your	interests,	and	we	may	
agree	with	Hardin	that	it’s	unlikely	that	they	do,	it	still	doesn’t	seem	too	cognitively	
stretching	to	gauge	whether	politicians	are	trustworthy	based,	for	example,	on	the	
answers	to	‘cui	bono?’	about	their	choices,	alignments	and	funding.	Assuming	we	can	
come	to	a	determination	in	these	cases	so	rarely	that	it	is	politically	irrelevant	seems	
implausible.	The	perverse	side	effect	of	throwing	an	epistemological	blanket	over	
politics	in	this	way	is	that	it	blots	out	quite	commonplace	grounds	for	specific	critical	
judgments	about	politicians’	trustworthiness.	
Hardin’s	epistemological	and	motivational	doubts	about	trust	in	politics	are	built	
on	and	directed	at	the	responsiveness	conception.	However,	the	prior	question,	in	the	
light	of	the	general	challenges	to	the	responsiveness	conception	of	interpersonal,	is	
 14 
whether	this	is	a	conception	of	political	trust	that	underpins	the	value	that	trust	
theorists	ascribe	to	it.	Recall	the	two	instances	of	the	general	claim	that	trust	is	
instrumentally	valuable	for	democratic	governance	–	that	an	electoral	system	requires	
voters	and	the	opposition	to	trust	the	governing	party	to	give	up	power,	if	it	loses;	and	
that	democratic	politics	requires	trust	on	the	part	of	participants	that	others	will	adhere	
to	established	conventions	over	such	matters	as	appointment	of	judges.		
As	in	the	broader	interpersonal	case,	neither	of	these	examples	requires	that	
trust	consists	in	a	belief	or	affective	acceptance	on	our	part	in	the	good	will	of	those	
trusted	toward	us.	To	say	that	the	outgoing	political	party	trusts	the	incoming	
opposition	is	not	to	say	that	they	believe	in	the	good	will	of	their	opponents;	they	may	
view	their	political	opponents	as	set	on	their	utter	political	annihilation.	Nevertheless	
their	trust	consists	in	believing	that	their	opponents	won’t	do	just	anything	in	pursuit	of	
their	goals,	and	in	particular	won’t	set	aside	constitutional	constraints	and	norms	in	
order	to	achieve	that.5	Similarly,	if	we	take	the	‘norm	erosion’	view	of	the	behaviour	of	
the	Senate	in	2016,	where	a	proponent	of	the	status	quo,	or	a	Democrat,	may	feel	
betrayed	is	not	necessarily	because	she	feels	that	that	her	assumption	that	the	good	will	
she	had	thought	that	the	Mitch	McConnell	or	other	Republican	Senators	had	toward	her	
interests	has	turned	out	not	to	exist.	The	impact	on	her	interests	seems	subordinate;	the	
betrayal	consists	in	their	not	having	adhered	to	what	had	been	thought	to	be	a	set	of	
commonly	understood	rules	of	the	game.6	To	return	to	a	previous	example:	the	concern	
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5	This	is	one	way	of	distinguishing	the	agonism	some	theorists	think	of	as	essential	to	
the	political	from	a	bare-knuckled	antagonism	that	erodes	it	(Mouffe	2000).	
6	This	isn’t	to	say	the	rules	were/are	morally	commendable	of	course,	or	that	betrayal	in	
this	sense	is	always	unjustified.	One	can	be	morally	doubtful	of	the	norms	being	eroded	
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about	Blair’s	trustworthiness	needn’t	be	that	citizens	judge	that	he	is	acting	to	damage	
their	interests;	it’s	that	he	has	not	been	publicly	honest.	Had	he	been	thought	to	be	
dishonest	but	nevertheless	thought	to	be	deeply	concerned	for	the	public	good	and	his	
policies	had	only	had	positive	effects	on	citizens’	interests,	the	worry	about	trust	would	
remain.	Now	we	may	ask	in	each	case	why	political	agents	play	by	these	rules,	and	there	
may	be	various	answers;	the	suggestion	here	is	that	trust	and	distrust	consist	in	a	prior	
judgement,	about	whether	someone	has	played	by	these	rules.	Although,	as	we’ve	seen,	
trust	theorists	invoke	vulnerability	as	a	condition	of	trust,	as	part	of	this	responsiveness	
conception	(e.g.,	Lenard	2012:	18-20,	141-6)	this	also	does	not	seem	necessary	for	their	
account.	In	the	recycling	case,	for	example,	my	neighbour’s	failure	to	comply	may	not	
adversely	affect	my	interests;	nevertheless,	it	undermines,	and	should	undermine,	my	
trust	in	her	to	recycle,	and	perhaps	also	to	conform	to	other	civic	norms.		
Perhaps,	however,	there	is	a	tenable	milder	version	of	the	responsiveness	claim	
to	the	effect	that	responsiveness	is	sufficient	but	not	necessary	for	trust:	if	I	judge	that	
the	tennis	player	has	a	good	will	toward	me	then	I	trust	her.	If	the	opposition	judges	
that	the	governing	party	is	responsive	to	it,	at	least	to	the	extent	of	abiding	by	election	
results	that	go	in	its	favour,	then	it	trusts	the	governing	party.	However,	we	can	rely	on	
someone’s	good	will	or	responsiveness	toward	us	without	our	trusting	them.	For	
example,	you	can	rely	on	my	responsiveness	to	your	interests	if	I	find	you	very	
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
while	thinking	that	this	analytically	captures	the	breakdown	of	trust.	Further,	it	isn’t	the	
case	that	betrayal	can	occur	only	when	we	trust	–	distrust	can	include	expectation	of	
betrayal	(Hawley	2014:	13):	I	discuss	distrust,	and	its	connection	to	a	commitment	
view,	in	the	final	section.	The	point	here	is	only	that	betrayal	of	trust	makes	sense	in	the	
context	of	this	kind	of	argument.		
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intimidating,	but	this	isn’t	to	say	that	this	responsiveness	on	my	part	means	you	can	
trust	me,	and,	if	I	don’t	in	fact	support	you,	you	haven’t	been	betrayed.		There	are	
reasons,	then,	to	think	that	responsiveness	does	not	capture	trust,	and	I	want	next	to	
outline	in	more	detail	an	alternative	view	of	trust	prompted	by	this	line	of	reasoning.	
	
3.! Political	trust	and	commitment	
For	a	commitment	account,	to	trust	someone	to	do	something	is	to	think	that	she	has	a	
commitment	to	doing	it	and	to	rely	upon	her	to	meet	that	commitment.	Unlike	the	
responsiveness	account,	this	approach	views	my	trusting	as	neutral	about	the	trusted’s	
motivations	toward	me:	these	may	or	may	not	be	thought	of	as	responsive	to	my	
interests.	When	it	comes	to	political	trust,	the	difference	between	the	responsive	and	
commitment	conceptions	lies	in	the	emphasis	of	the	first	on	our	having	grounds	to	think	
that	politicians	and	officials	have	the	right	kind	of	motivations	and	incentives	to	be	
responsive	to	our	interests,	and,	when	they	don’t,	on	the	vulnerability	and	damage	to	
our	interests	that	we	risk;	where	the	emphasis	of	the	second	is	on	normative	success	or	
failure.	Of	course,	this	doesn’t	mean	that	we	have	no	concern	about	the	impact	of	
politicians’	and	other	officials’	behaviour	on	our	interests	–	far	from	it;	but	we	trust	or	
distrust	depending	on	whether	we	think	they	are	sticking	to	commitments,	not	on	our	
view	of	how	they	are	motivated	toward	us.	
‘Commitment’	is	a	term	with	a	tangled	genealogy	in	philosophy	and	the	social	
sciences,	and	this	isn’t	the	place	to	try	to	elaborate	a	detailed	theory.7	In	this	context,	we	
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7	The	notion	of	a	commitment	appears	in	a	wide	range	of	theoretical	as	well	as	popular	
contexts.	Most	relevant	here	are	the	treatments	in	Gilbert	2006;	Fossen	2013	(cf.	
Festenstein	2016).	In	Fossen’s	presentation,	commitments	play	a	foundational	role,	
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can	start	with	a	paradigm	case	of	commitment	as	promise,	including	a	publicly	made	
pledge	such	as	appear	in	political	parties’	electoral	manifestos	or	an	oath	of	office.8	
When	we	trust	politicians	or	officials	in	this	kind	of	case,	we	think	they’ll	fulfil	the	
commitment	they	have	undertaken,	and	we	may	feel	betrayed	if	they	don’t.	As	these	
examples	suggest,	commitment	in	the	relevant	sense	here	is	different	from	having	a	
firmly	fixed	psychological	intention	(Hawley	2014:	10).	You	can	be	held	to	have	
commitments	without	anyone’s	thinking	you	have	ever	had	a	very	firm	intention	to	do	
what	you’re	committed	to	doing:	where	you’ve	promised	to	take	me	to	the	airport,	it	
makes	sense	to	ascribe	the	commitment	to	you,	even	if	you’ve	no	intention	of	fulfilling	it	
(or	if	the	intention	has	faded	since	you	made	the	promise);	a	politician	can	be	held	to	a	
manifesto	commitment	even	if	she	has	only	a	very	insecure	and	hazy	psychological	
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
drawing	on	Robert	Brandom’s	imposing	account	of	‘the	implicit	structure	characteristic	
of	discursive	practice	as	such’	(Brandom	1994:	374).		Norms	arise	within	practices	of	
giving	and	asking	for	reasons,	and	in	accepting	reasons	and	making	claims	participants	
bind	themselves	to	standards	that	go	beyond	their	subjective	interpretation	of	their	
commitments.	What	it	is	for	us	to	think	of	ourselves	and	others	as	normative	beings	is	
as	capable	of	undertaking	commitments,	ascribing	them	to	others	and	accepting	
responsibility	for	them.	Calling	an	authority	legitimate	or	illegitimate,	for	example,	is	a	
matter	of	‘taking	a	stance’	in	a	linguistic	practice,	attributing	various	commitments	and	
entitlements	to	oneself	and	other	participants:	to	take	a	claim	to	authority	to	be	
legitimate	is	to	accept	commitments	to	obey	while	to	reject	it	is	to	accept	commitments	
to	treat	it	as	a	coercive	imposition.			
8	See	too	Eric	Beerbohm’s	discussion	of	‘assurances’	in	electioneering	(Beerbohm	2016).	
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intention	to	fulfil	it.	In	each	case,	the	point	is,	I’m	entitled	to	trust	the	other	since	I’m	
rightly	attributing	to	them	a	commitment	that	they	in	fact	have.		
Yet	to	account	for	interpersonal	trust,	a	commitment	account	needs	a	fairly	
broad	conception	of	commitment,	which	goes	beyond	explicit	promises,	pledges	and	
oaths	to	encompass	a	range	of	more	or	less	tacit,	explicit,	discretionary	and	non-
discretionary	commitments	and	norms.	Individual	(or	collective)	will	or	consent	doesn’t	
in	itself	ground	commitments	without	social	or	public	roles	and	common	
understandings	of	those	roles,	and	relevant	social	institutions:	I	can	swear	an	oath	of	
office	but,	unless	I’ve	been	duly	elected,	I’m	not	really	undertaking	the	commitments	
that	attach	to	it;	and	the	content	of	the	oath	is	itself	a	public	document.9	We	attribute	
commitments	on	the	basis	of	social	roles	and	identities	of	those	to	whom	the	
commitments	are	attributed	(as	sister	or	citizen,	for	example),	and	our	attribution	of	a	
commitment	may	in	turn	be	deeply	shaped	by	our	own	identities,	beliefs	and	feelings.		
Since	social	roles	and	identities	are	often	contestable,	particularly	in	political	
contexts,	this	opens	up	the	space	for	contestation	over	the	commitments	we	may	think	
someone	has,	what	counts	as	a	commitment,	and	what	counts	as	fulfilment.	
Commitments	themselves	may	be	implicit	or	unexpressed	until	a	problem	arises:	as	
Simpson	puts	it,	the	concept	of	trust	functions	as	an	alarm	bell,	drawing	attention	to	a	
problem	in	habitual	reliance	(Simpson	2011).	This	helps	us	understand	why	perceived	
breakdowns	or	violations	of	trust	often	provide	the	moments	when	disagreement	over	
the	commitments	entangled	with	social	roles	as	well	as	the	attribution	of	the	roles	
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9	There	is	a	further	conditionality,	which	there	isn’t	scope	to	explore	here,	in	relation	to	
the	mode	of	uptake	when	explicit	promises	are	made:	are	you	committed	to	a	pledge	to	
me	that	I	haven’t	accepted?	For	a	negative	answer,	see	Beerbohm	2016.	
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themselves	is	ventilated.	We	can	argue	over	whether	you	have	fulfilled	the	
commitments	expected	of	you	in	a	particular	case	(‘We	trusted	you	to	represent	our	
interests	in	the	negotiations,	but	you	did	what?’).	We	argue	over	whether	we	have	the	
attribution	of	commitments	right	(‘She	calls	herself	–	or,	we’ve	thought	of	her	as	–	a	
friend,	etc.,	but	is	that	what	she	is?’).	But	we	also	argue	over	the	commitments	attached	
to	roles	more	generally	(‘Is	that	what	a	friend/boss/citizen	of	the	
republic/neighbour/babysitter/pastor/soldier	does?’).	Further,	of	course,	the	norms,	
structures	and	roles	underpinning	commitments	and	so	shaping	attitudes	of	trust	are	
open	to	public	debate.		
This	approach	allows	us	to	understand	why	other	people	–	not	just	the	trusted	
and	truster	–	can	contribute	to	questions	about	whether	someone	is	trustworthy	or	has	
been	betrayed	(cf.	Mullin	2005:	325).	For	these	are	contestable	public	questions	about	
the	commitments	we	attribute	to	others.	While	this	doesn’t	eliminate	problems	of	
empirical	complexity	and	epistemic	uncertainty	in	working	out	just	what	is	going	on	
politically	(how	could	it?),	it	does	suggest	that	the	attribution	of	commitment	isn’t	just	a	
factual	matter	about	which	we	need	a	determination,	as	it	is	when	Hardin	seeks	to	
establish	whether	or	not	you	encapsulate	my	interests.	Rather,	the	commitments	that	
it’s	appropriate	to	attribute	to	you	are	subject	to	political	debate,	since	they	rest	on	a	
contestable	array	of	social	norms,	conventions	and	practices.		
For	this	account,	you	betray	me	when	you	don’t	act	on	the	commitment	that	I’ve	
correctly	attributed	to	you,	but	not	just	in	any	case	where	you	disappoint	me,	including	
when	you	fail	to	act	on	a	commitment	that	I’ve	wrongly	attributed	to	you.	This	isn’t	to	
say	you	can’t	disappoint	me	in	those	circumstances,	but	I’m	mistaken	if	I	say	that	you	
have	betrayed	my	trust,	since	I	wasn’t	entitled	to	trust	you	in	the	first	place.	To	return	to	
the	case	of	the	unreliable	prime	minister:	what	entitles	us	to	trust	him,	and	so	to	feel	
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betrayed	if	we	think	he	has	broken	this	trust,	is	not	that	we	think	he	is	motivated	not	to	
protect	a	particular	interest	of	ours	(say,	in	official	honesty),	even	if	that	is	true.	Rather,	
we	trust	him	because	we	rightly	attribute	a	commitment	to	him	to	be	honest,	no	matter	
how	his	motivations	stand	to	our	interests,	and	are	betrayed	when	this	is	a	commitment	
he	fails	to	fulfil.	And	this	in	turn	entitles	a	sense	of	betrayal	or	broken	trust.	It’s	worth	
underlining	that	for	this	conception,	just	as	trustworthiness	doesn’t	in	itself	imply	moral	
integrity,	betrayal	doesn’t	imply	moral	odium.	If	I	pledge	support	for	you	at	the	
Hobbesian	point	of	your	sword	and	then	break	that	pledge,	you	have	been	betrayed,	on	
this	account	(Baumgold	2013).	
As	we've	seen,	one	way	in	which	we	mistakenly	moralise	trust	is	by	assuming	
that	it	is	always	morally	commendable	or	relies	on	a	moral	virtue	of	integrity	or	
trustworthiness.	From	a	commitment	perspective,	there	is	a	distinct	kind	of	moralism	in	
identifying	feeling	disappointed	or	being	let	down	as	betrayal	or	the	breaking	of	trust	
(Gilbert	2006;	Hawley	2014).	It’s	quite	common	to	feel	disappointed	in	our	political	
opponents,	for	instance,	when	they	sink	even	further	below	our	already	depressed	
expectations,	without	a	suggestion	that	we	ever	trusted	them	not	to	stoop	this	low,	at	
least	not	as	more	than	a	rhetorical	flourish.	We	can	also	feel	betrayed	when	we	aren’t	
really	entitled	to,	where	we	wrongly	(or	in	bad	faith)	attribute	a	commitment	that	isn’t	
there.	This	doesn’t	only	include	cases	where	you	feel	betrayed,	for	example,	by	your	
favourite	celebrity	failing	to	respond	to	your	communications,	marrying	someone	else,	
or	expressing	an	abhorrent	political	opinion,	but	in	fact	aren't	entitled	to	have	trusted	
them	in	these	ways	to	begin	with.			
Political	trust,	in	the	interpersonal	sense	that	is	the	focus	here,	then,	consists	in	
relying	on	political	actors	and	officials	to	act	on	the	commitments	that	we	attribute	to	
them	by	virtue	of	these	roles	or	the	actions,	such	as	campaign	pledges,	that	flow	from	
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them.	With	these	ideas	in	place,	let’s	return	to	the	value	attached	to	this	form	of	trust.	
To	recall	the	kind	of	use	made	of	trust:	the	claim	now	is	that,	when	I	win	an	election,	my	
trusting	a	defeated	incumbent	doesn’t	consist	in	the	belief	that	the	defeated	candidate	
will	step	down	out	of	good	will	or	responsiveness	to	my	interests.	Rather,	my	trust	
consists	in	reliance	on	the	defeated	incumbent’s	adhering	to	her	commitment	to	the	
norms	and	rules	governing	the	election.	I	may	be	a	member	of	the	losing	party	or	my	
interests	may	be	adversely	affected	by	the	change	of	government	but	it	nevertheless	
makes	sense	to	say	I	trust	the	defeated	party	leadership	to	step	down.	In	other	words,	
political	trust	is	reliance	on	others	to	act	according	to	the	commitments	we	attribute	to	
them,	not	to	act	with	good	will	toward	us	or	with	reference	to	our	interests.		
A	proponent	of	responsiveness	may	worry	that	a	false	dichotomy	is	being	set	up.	
In	some	cases,	we	can	think	of	people	having	certain	sorts	of	commitment	only	when	
these	are	accompanied	by	appropriate	motivations,	feelings	and	dispositions:	for	
example,	I	can	trust	you	as	a	friend	only	if	I	think	that	you’re	motivated	toward	me	in	
the	right	way.	In	this	kind	of	case,	to	attribute	a	commitment	is	to	attribute	
responsiveness.	However,	even	if	we	think	trust	involves	ascribing	certain	motivations,	
feelings	and	dispositions	to	the	trusted,	the	relevant	motivations,	feelings	and	
dispositions	needn’t	always	involve	good	will	directed	at	the	truster,	in	any	sense:	they	
may	consist,	for	instance,	only	in	respect	for	the	sanctity	of	the	rules	or	an	unthinking	
conformism.	In	itself	the	entanglement	of	motivations	(toward	my	interests)	and	
commitment	doesn’t	mean	that	there	isn’t	a	significant	distinction	to	be	drawn	between	
these	two	conceptions.	
We	may	still	think	that	responsiveness	isn’t	really	distinguished	from	a	
commitment	account	since	the	former	relies	on,	or	at	least	typically	can	rely	on,	people’s	
commitments	to	explain	why	others	are	likely	to	be	responsive	to	you	and	why	you	
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believe	they	are;	and	still	maintain	the	view	that	trust	itself	consists	in	your	reliance	on	
them	to	be	motivated	in	the	right	way	toward	your	interests.	Now	it	makes	sense	that	
there	can	be	cases	where	good	will	can	help	explain	the	fulfilment	of	commitments,	and	
that	you	can	view	the	fulfilment	of	commitments	as	bearing	on	your	interests.	The	
suggestion	here,	though,	is	that	what	constitutes	trust	is	your	holding	that	they	will	fulfil	
their	commitments:	if	you	believe	that	a	politician	will	fulfil	her	campaign	pledge,	then	
you	trust	her.		
Contra	writers	such	as	Hardin,	Lenard,	and	Warren	–	from	their	very	different	
perspectives	on	the	democratic	politics	of	trust	–	the	responsive	alignment	of	interests	
between	trusted	and	truster	is	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	for	warranted	trust,	and	
that	the	conflict	of	interests	that	characterise	political	relationships	in	itself	doesn’t	
create	a	tension	between	trust	and	the	political.	To	ask	if	we	trust	you	isn’t	to	ask	
whether	or	not	we	think	we	share	interests	with	you	or	are	motivated	to	tend	for	our	
interests	but	to	ask	whether	or	not	you’ll	fulfil	the	commitments	that	we	judge	you	have.	
The	tension	between	politics	and	trust	arises	not	from	a	clash	of	interests	or	from	
epistemic	uncertainty	about	the	motivations	of	political	actors,	although	these	can	form	
part	of	our	explanation	of	why	we	think	someone	is	trustworthy	or	not.	These	are	
reasons,	of	course,	why	we	might	not	rely	on	others:	why	we	may	not	be	sure	what	
they’ll	do,	how	they	are	oriented	toward	us,	including	whether	or	not	they’ll	fulfil	
commitments	we	judge	they	have.	But	the	specific	and	prior	concern	when	we	trust	is	
with	the	attribution	and	content	of	commitments	as	well	as	with	the	judgment	about	
whether	someone	is	adhering	to	them.	
			
4.! Judgment,	distrust,	institutions	
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So	far,	I’ve	tried	to	justify	thinking	about	interpersonal	trust	in	politics	through	the	lens	
of	commitment	rather	than	responsiveness.	I	want	to	use	this	final	section	to	highlight	
three	implications	of	thinking	about	political	trust	in	this	way	to	draw	out	the	contrast	
between	the	two	conceptions	a	little	further,	and	in	doing	so	to	explore	some	further	
questions	for	this	approach,	in	relation	to	political	judgment,	distrust,	and	institutions.		
Judgments	about	whether	or	not	to	trust	in	any	particular	case	don’t	at	their	core	
involve	an	attempt	to	gauge	whether	an	individual	is	benignly	motivated	toward	me,	or	
morally	praiseworthy,	(Hardin’s	‘street	level	epistemology’)	but	engage	public	and	
normative	debates	about	the	content	and	fulfilment	of	public	roles	–	how	to	interpret	a	
president’s	speech	and	actions,	or	the	commitments	attached	to	the	office.	As	we’ve	
seen,	the	commitments	that	we	think	attach	to	roles,	and	the	roles	themselves,	are	
contestable.	Further,	even	when	we	share	a	common	view	of	the	commitments	that	flow	
from	an	office,	we	can	still	diverge	in	our	judgment	of	the	criteria	for	appraising	
whether	or	not	those	commitments	have	been	fulfilled	or	a	particular	officeholder	
meets	those	criteria.	From	this	perspective,	political	trust	is	political	not	because	it	
applies	to	certain	kinds	of	officeholders	but	because	of	the	evaluatively	contestable	
character	of	these	judgments	about	commitments,	criteria	and	application.	To	recall	
what	Warren	says	about	the	political	and	conditions	of	trust,	conflicts	of	interests	may	
explain	these	divergent	judgments	about	commitments	but	the	divergence	itself	
constitutes	a	space	of	political	contestation.10		
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10	This	isn’t	to	say	that	political	judgment	in	this	space	is	indeterminate:	the	conflict	
over	determinate	sovereign	judgment	in	relation	to	these	issues	is	of	course	fertile	
territory	for	modern	political	theorising	(e.g.,	Tully	2002;	Baumgold	2013;	Fossen	2013;	
Zerilli	2016).	
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This	leads	us	to	consider	distrust.	Distrust	in	democratic	theory	is	a	large	and,	as	
a	number	of	authors	have	argued,	distinct	topic,	along	with	‘in-between’	states	such	as	
mistrust	(e.g.,	Allard-Tremblay	2015;	Hardin	2002;	Hawley	2014;	Krishnamurthy	2015;	
Lenard	2012:	54-74;	Rosanvallon	2008;	Ullman-Margalit	2004);	however,	the	contrast	
between	responsiveness	and	commitment	conceptions	can	be	highlighted	here	too.	
Distrust	doesn’t	consist	merely	in	the	absence	of	trust	or	of	reliance:	rather,	it	is	‘best	
interpreted	as	an	attitude	that	reflects	suspicion	or	cynicism	about	the	actions	of	others’	
(Lenard	2012:	56).	From	a	responsiveness	perspective,	this	suspicion	amounts	to	more	
than	the	thought	that	you	won’t	rely	on	the	distrusted	since	you	think	she	lacks	a	good	
will	toward	you:	this	is	the	kind	of	non-reliance	that	parallels	reliance	on	an	inanimate	
object.	Rather,	we	distrust	when	we	think	that	we	can’t	rely	on	someone	since	as	ill-
disposed	toward	our	interests.	For	example,	Hardin	argues	that,	in	spite	of	the	epistemic	
opacity	of	politicians	and	officials,	we	have	general	theoretical	reasons	to	assume	that	
they	will	act	against	our	interests	and	so	to	distrust	them:	the	‘incentives	of	government	
agents	were	[to	use	their	power]	to	arrange	benefits	for	themselves	through	
impositions	on	others.	Such	incentives	are	a	recipe	for	distrust	in	the	sense	that	those	
on	the	wrong	end	of	the	interventions	could	see	that	their	own	interests	were	sacrificed	
for	others	merely	because	someone	had	the	power	to	intervene’	(Hardin	2006:	136).	In	
other	words,	in	spite	of	the	epistemic	opacity	that	pulls	the	rug	from	under	reasonable	
trust,	for	Hardin,	there	are	good	reasons	for	distrust	grounded	in	this	reading	of	
political	motivations.	
For	the	commitment	conception,	to	distrust	someone	to	do	something	is	to	
believe	that	she	has	a	commitment	to	doing	it	and	yet	think	that	she	won’t	meet	that	
commitment	(Hawley	2014:	10).	Political	distrust,	then,	flows	from	the	judgment	that	
politicians	and	officials	have	motives	or	incentives	not	to	fulfil	these	commitments:	if	we	
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distrust	the	defeated	parliamentary	group,	it	is	because	we	think	they	have	a	
commitment	to	step	down	but	aren’t	in	fact	likely	to	do	so.	Systemic	distrust	arises	
when	we	think	that	there	is	a	deep	misalignment	between	the	incentives	driving	
politicians’	and	officials’	behaviour	and	the	commitments	attached	to	the	roles	that	we	
have	empowered	them	to	fulfil,	as	in	Hardin’s	recipe.	Here	liberal	and	republican	theory	
insists	on	institutionalized	distrust	in	the	forms	of	checks	and	balances,	the	separation	
of	powers,	bicameralism,	dispersal	of	power,	and	mechanisms	of	accountability	and	
transparency	(e.g.,	Pettit	1998;	Dunn	1999;	Rosanvallon	2008;	Waldron	2016:	167-94:	
Bruno	2017).	It	is	easy	to	see	how	distrust	–	and,	as	Pettit	points	out,	the	expression	of	
distrust	–	can	be	a	civic	virtue,	a	way	in	which	we	can	discipline	rulers,	‘essential	not	
only	to	democratic	progress	but	also	…	to	a	healthy	suspicion	of	power	upon	which	the	
vitality	of	democracy	depends’	(Warren	1999:	310).	For	some	theorists,	contemporary	
democracy	demands	an	ethos	of	distrust,	which	seems	to	comport	more	comfortably	
with	fears	of	heteronomy	or	subjection	to	arbitrary	power	than	does	trusting	(Allard-
Tremblay	2015;	Krishnamurthy	2015).	Nevertheless,	what	I’ve	suggested	here	is	that	
distrust	rests	on	a	condition	for	the	possibility	of	trust,	namely,	the	recognition	of	a	
commitment	in	relation	to	which	you	may	be	betrayed	or	let	down.	Indeed,	if	we	accept	
this	commitment	view,	it	suggests	a	reason	why	democratic	politics	is	inherently	
susceptible	to	crises	of	interpersonal	trust,	in	this	sense.	Although	we	may	wish	it	were	
not	the	case	(Fisher,	Van	Heerde,	and	Tucker	2010:	183),	competitive	overpromising	is	
a	feature,	rather	than	a	bug,	of	democratic	politics.	Perhaps	as	a	result	of	the	focus	on	
deliberative	and	agonistic	dimensions	of	political	argument,	this	hasn’t	received	the	
attention	that	it	merits	from	contemporary	democratic	theory	(but	see	Beerbohm	
2016).	
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However,	distrust	isn't	exhausted	by	the	identification	of	the	likely	failure	on	an	
individual’s	part	to	fulfil	commitments.	If	we	distrust	some	police	officers,	for	example,	
this	may	be	because	we	don’t	think	of	them	as	fulfilling	the	commitments	that	go	with	
their	role	–	if	they	take	bribes	or	routinely	stop	and	search	members	of	minority	ethnic	
groups,	for	example.	But	we	may	distrust	them	precisely	when	we	think	they	are	in	fact	
complying	with	what	we	think	of	as	the	commitments	and	norms	that	attaching	to	their	
roles.	We	distrust	them	in	this	case	not	because	we	don’t	think	they	will	fulfil	relevant	
commitments	but	because	we	think	of	the	commitments	as	defective:	we	have	a	critique	
of	the	institutions	and	practices,	as	including	forms	of	corruption	or	institutional	racism,	
for	example	(Wight	2003;	Yuval-Davis	2007).	For	this	reason,	it	makes	sense	to	say	that	
you	can	act	from	commitments	qua	police	officer,	for	example,	that	are	themselves	the	
basis	of	my	distrust	of	you.	The	first	kind	of	distrust	is	interpersonal:	police	corruption	
is	a	failure	of	those	officers	with	respect	to	the	standards	or	commitments	that	we	think	
that	the	police	should	adhere	to.	Distrust	in	this	case	too	then	means	that	the	distrusted	
are	thought	of	as	not	doing	something	we	should	be	able	to	rely	on	them	to	do.	The	
second	kind	of	distrust	is	institutional,	directed	at	the	role	(or	how	the	role	is	
instantiated	in	a	particular	place	and	time),	which	moves	us	out	of	the	space	of	distrust	
in	an	interpersonal	sense.		This	takes	us	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article.	However,	the	
approach	developed	here	suggests	that	institutional	distrust,	as	opposed	to	other	forms	
of	non-reliance,	hostility	or	opposition	to	institutions,	requires	at	least	a	framework	of	
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normative	(but	not	necessarily	moral)	expectations	in	relation	to	which	we	judge	that	
the	institutions	and	roles	have	failed.11		
	
5.	Conclusion	
As	citizens,	we	have	an	interest	in	assessing	the	ethical	integrity	of	politicians	and	
officials	as	well	as	an	interest	in	gauging	whether	or	not	they	are	responsive	to	us	and	
how	their	actions	will	impact	on	us.	Legitimate	as	these	interests	are,	I’ve	argued	that	
they	shouldn’t	be	conflated	with	our	interest	in	political	trust	and	distrust;	this	is	a	
distinct	concern	with	whether	or	not	they	are	acting	out	of	commitments.	While	our	
paradigm	cases	of	commitment	take	the	voluntaristic	form	of	pledges	and	promises,	to	
view	trust	through	the	frame	of	commitment	attribution	in	this	way	highlights	the	
importance	of	the	social	practices	that	underpin	the	commitment-endowing	function	of	
pledges,	as	well	as	the	commitments	attached	to	social	and	political	roles,	norms	and	
institutions,	and	the	political	judgment	that	may	underlie	and	contest	the	attribution	of	
commitments.	Failure	to	see	this	underpinning	for	judgments	of	trust	leaves	us	exposed	
to	an	often	moralising	identification	of	disappointment	with	betrayal.		
	 Embracing	it,	by	contrast,	allows	us	to	see	that	interpersonal	political	trust	relies	
on	a	contestable,	normative	but	non-moral	public	space.	Moving	from	a	responsiveness	
to	a	commitment	conception	of	political	trust	means	that	the	question	of	whether	we	
should	trust	in	politics	isn’t	addressed	by	our	making	an	epistemic	determination	of	the	
good	will	of	others	but	by	establishing	where	they	are	situated	in	this	evaluatively	
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11	Meena	Krishnamurthy	(2015)	makes	the	case	for	the	democratic	value	of	distrust	
(that	she	takes	from	Martin	Luther	King)	as	the	belief	that	another	will	act	unjustly	(see	
King	1964).		
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contestable	public	space	of	commitments	and	judgments	about	their	fulfilment.	This	
suggests	that	political	trust	appears	fragile	not	primarily	because	it	is	empirically	
difficult	to	assess	the	motivations	of	others,	however	true	that	may	be,	but	because	it	is	
inherently	a	site	of	political	struggle.		
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